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STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Does the bad

check

statute

apply when

(1) a check with a

restrictive endorsement is offered to settle a potential claim
against another, (2) the offer is rejected, (3) the return of the
check is requested, (4) the money in the account to cover the
check is used for other purposes subsequent to the rejection of
the offer and (5) the offeree fails to return the check and then,
many weeks later, changes his mind and deposits the check which is
then returned for lack of funds in the account?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Section 7-15-1 of the Utah Code, as amended, is the sole and
determinative statute.

A copy of said statute is attached in

Appellant's Addendum, pg. i.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff's
action.
against

The

Third Amended

first

Defendant

alleged

Regency.

Complaint

alleged

a third-party
The second

two causes of

beneficiary

alleged

theory

a violation

by

Defendant Regency of the fraudulent check statute, Section 10-152 (sic) of the Utah Code.
20, 1988.
granted

After the Plaintiff rested its case the trial court

a motion

Regency.

The case was tried to the bench on July

to

dismiss the two causes of

action

against

At the conclusion of the trial, judgment was entered in

favor of Plaintiff against Defendant Bowers for the unpaid balance
of materials
$5,246.

supplied

by Plaintiff

in the principal

amount of

This appeal is only as to the dismissal of the fraudulent

check cause of action.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Defendant Eugene Bowers (hereinafter "Bowers") contracted

for the construction of an apartment complex in Salt Lake County.
(Tr. 138)
2.

Defendant Bowers hired Bowers Building and Construction

Co. Inc., a Utah corporation, (hereinafter "Bowers Building") to
act as the general contractor on the project. (Tr. 139)
3.

Bowers Building subcontracted the plumbing work to Horace

Lloyd. (Tr. 141) The subcontract amount was approximately $97,000.
(TR. 142)
4.

Horace

Lloyd

Plaintiff/Appellant

purchased

Peterson

plumbing

Plumbing
2

materials

Supply

from

(hereinafter

"Plaintiff") from approximately June of 1983 to August of 1984.
Approximately

$90,000 was paid from the construction loan to

Appellant for materials supplied to the subject project. (Tr. 14344)
5.

Horace Lloyd failed to pay Appellant for all of the

materials furnished to the project.

Appellant claimed that it was

due a principal amount of approximately $19,000.

The trial court

found that only $5,246 was actually due. (R. 142)
6.
Ltd.,

During 1984 Defendant/Respondents Regency Apartments
a Utah

limited

partnership,

(hereinafter

"Regency")

negotiated with Bowers for the acquisition of the property.
7.

On December 31, 1984, the closing occurred on the

property between Bowers and Regency.

The same day the property

was sold by Regency to Wilshire Utah I Limited Partnership. (Tr.
84)
8.

Wilshire failed to make the required payments to the

first mortgage holder, American Savings and Loan, as well as to
Bowers and Regency.

Wilshire has since filed for protection under

the bankruptcy laws.

American Savings thereafter foreclosed on

the property. (R. 84)
9.

After the receipt of a payment from Wilshire in April of

1985 Jeffrey Bernson, a representative of Regency, contacted
several entities claiming money from Bowers and/or Bowers Building
for work performed on the project. Mr. Bernson attempted to
negotiate a settlement with the creditors.

To the extent the

entities were willing to accept an amount less than the amount
3

claimed, Regency would then obtain a credit against the sums owed
by Regency to Bowers. (Tr. 97-98)

All of the creditors, except

Plaintiff, negotiated a settlement. (Tr. 96)
10.

Plaintiff was presented a check dated May 15, 1985 drawn

on the account of Regency in the amount of $13,750.
check is found in the record at page 102.
restrictive

endorsement

which

indicated

A copy of the

The check contained a
that Plaintiff, by

endorsing the check, would be releasing any and all claims it
might have against Bowers and/or the property.

(Tr. 104)

The

$13,750 figure was an arbitrary offer to settle a claim by
Plaintiff of approximately $19,000. (Tr. 96, R. 102)
11.

After receipt of the check Don Peterson, the president

of Plaintiff, telephoned both Mr. Bernson and Mr. Babcock, both
partners in Regency, in two separate telephone calls, and informed
them that Plaintiff was unwilling to accept the amount offered by
means of the check.

Mr. Peterson asked for more money but was

told that it was a take it or leave it offer. (Tr. 17-18, 74, 109)
12.

Mr. Bernson asked Mr. Peterson to return the check. (Tr.

13.

Mr. Peterson failed to return the check but rather

109)

posted it on a mirror in his office where he could look at it
every day. (Tr. 18)
14.

Approximately six weeks later Mr. Peterson changed his

mind and decided to accept the check and therefore deposited the
check.

(Tr. 18)

4

15.

The

funds

available

to

cover

the

check

in the

eventuality that the offer was accepted were then used for other
partnership purposes by Regency.

The check therefore did not

clear when it was eventually presented to the bank for payment
some six weeks after it was requested to be returned. (Tr. 109110)
16.

The trial court found that Regency never received

anything of value from Plaintiff in exchange for the check.
129)

(Tr.

Plaintiff had supplied the materials many months before the

check was offered by Regency. (Tr. 129)

Any mechanic lien rights

had long since lapsed.
17.

The trial court also found that the check was given in

an effort to settle a claim, that Mr. Peterson chose not to accept
the offer, that Mr. Peterson was asked to return the check but did
not do so but deposited it many weeks later. (Tr. 129)
18.

The trial court entered judgment against Bowers on a

theory of quantum meruit since he was the owner of the project at
the time the materials were supplied by Plaintiff. (Tr. 157-58)
Judgment was entered for the unpaid balance of materials supplied
in the sum of $5,246. (Tr. 157, R. 142)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court properly applied the law interpreting the
fraudulent check statute to the facts found by the trial court.
The fraudulent check statute does not apply to a check offered as
a settlement of a claim against another which offer is rejected
5

and then, several weeks later, the offeree changes his mind and
deposits the check.

Further, the subject statute does not apply

since the check was not given for the purpose of obtaining from
Plaintiff anything of value.

ARGUMENT
I. THE FRAUDULENT CHECK STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY TO THE
FACTS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT. RATHER THE BASIC COMMON
LAW DOCTRINES OF CONTRACT FORMATION CONTROL.
The trial court held, in ruling from the bench on Regency's
motion

to

dismiss, that

the

check

was offered

by

Regency

to

Plaintiff to settle a claim which Mr. Peterson, exercising his own
judgment chose not to accept.

The court further held that the

check was asked to be returned but in fact was deposited many
weeks later. (Tr. 129-30) The court then concluded that it was not
persuaded

that the statutory

language had been met in creating

this cause of action. (Tr. 130)
The fraudulent check statute requires that a check be given
"for

the

purpose

of

obtaining

from

any

person...any

money,

merchandise, property or other thing of value or paying for any
service, wages, salary, or rent....11 The trial court
stated

found, as

above, that the check was not given for the purpose of

obtaining

something of value from the Plaintiff but rather was

offered to settle a claim Plaintiff had against another party.
Instead

of

Plaintiff

giving

up

something

chose not to accept

of value
the offer.

the court

found

that

The offer was

then

withdrawn as the check was asked to be returned to Regency.
6

Many

weeks later Plaintiff attempted to accept the previously withdrawn
offer by depositing the check.

It is basic common law that an

offer that is withdrawn cannot be accepted.
The check sent by Regency to Plaintiff was an offer to enter
into an accord and satisfaction.

The offer was found by the court

to have been rejected. It was then withdrawn.
and unilaterally

Plaintiff belatedly

attempted to seize the previously proposed

"satisfaction" portion of the proposed accord and satisfaction by
depositing the check approximately six weeks later.
The proverbial ever clear hindsight suggests that Regency
could have avoided this entire cause of action if it had stopped
payment on the check after Mr. Peterson chose not to accept the
check and Mr. Bernson asked Mr. Peterson to return it.

If payment

had been stopped on the check it would not have been returned for
insufficient funds.

Under those circumstances the fraudulent

check statute would clearly not have applied.

II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT REGENCY
OBTAINED NOTHING OF VALUE FROM PLAINTIFF BY GIVING
PLAINTIFF THE SUBJECT CHECK.
As stated above the fraudulent check statute requires that a
check be given for the purpose of obtaining something of value.
The trial court specifically found that the nothing of value had
been obtained by Regency from Plaintiff in exchange for the
presentment of the subject check. (Tr. 130)

This finding by the

trial court properly gave further support to the court's dismissal
of the fraudulent check cause of action.
7

Plaintiff contends that it gave up something of value.

A

careful analysis of that contention demonstrates that Plaintiff
gave up nothing of value in exchange for the check offered by
Regency.

The trial court specifically found that the material

supplied by Plaintiff to the Project had been supplied months
earlier for and on behalf and at the request of parties other than
Regency.
Plaintiff

(Tr.129)

Therefore, no goods were obtained

in exchange

for the subject check.

from

Furthermore,

Plaintiff was not induced to give up anything in exchange for the
check.

See HowellTs, Inc. v. Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147, (Utah, 1977).

Plaintiff asserts that the check was given for "value" to
release a potential lien.

Such an argument fails for two reasons.

First, Plaintiff clearly had no mechanic lien rights in May of
1985 when the check was presented when the last materials were
supplied by the Plaintiff to the Project in August of 1984.
Plaintiff, as a lower tiered supplier, had to file its lien within
80 days of supplying its last materials.

Since the check was

presented some seven months after the last materials were supplied
by Plaintiff and more than four months after the property had been
sold by Bowers to Regency and then to Wilshire Plaintiff had
absolutely no mechanic lien rights to give up.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Plaintiff did have
mechanic lien rights at the time it was offered the check this
argument would nonetheless also fail because Plaintiff chose not
to accept the check and therefore retained any and all mechanic
lien rights

it had.

The fraudulent
8

check

statute

clearly

contemplates, the trial court stated, an exchange (presumably of
contemporaneous nature) of a check for an item of value. (Tr. 129)
Since Plaintiff chose not to accept the check it certainly cannot
be held to have given up anything of value.
Plaintiff also contends that the check was given for "value"
to purchase credit towards the contract between Regency and
Bowers.

For reasons similar to those relating to the mechanic

lien argument this contention also fails. While Regency had hoped
to obtain a credit towards its contract with Bowers if Plaintiff
had timely accepted its offered check in fact Regency never did
obtain such credit.

The obvious reason the credit was not

obtained is that Plaintiff chose not to accept the offered check.
Further, since

Plaintiff's

claims

against Bowers were not

satisfied as evidenced by the judgment against Bowers in favor of
Plaintiff in the principal amount of $5,246.

Plaintiff retained

everything of value it had both before and after it was offered
the check.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Utah Uniform Commercial
Code definition of "for value" as it relates to the definition of
a "holder in due course" should be a basis for interpreting the
fraudulent

check

statute.

Plaintiff

asserts that the UCC

definition of "for value" applies in that the offered check was
given in payment for an antecedent debt.

This argument also fails

for reasons similar to those given in response to the prior two
arguments.

While the check was offered to settle a claim that

Plaintiff had against Bowers, Plaintiff chose not to accept the
9

check because

it was

for less than what Plaintiff

actually due and owing.

claimed

was

Since the antecedent debt alleged in this

matter was, in fact, the debt of Bowers, there is no consideration
for the check.

See Labrum v., Hansen, 665 P. 2d 1325, (Utah 1983)

and Matter of Voight f s Estate, 624 P.2d 1022, (NM App. 1980).
mentioned

above, Plaintiff

retained

all claims

it had

As

against

Bowers said claims being unaffected by either the offered check or
the rejection of said check.
or

forgive

the alleged

Plaintiff did not release or waive

antecedent

debt but rather pursued

the

antecedent debt of Bowers to judgment.
It should be noted that the argument relating
definition of
well.

to the UCC

"for value" is objectionable on other grounds as

Plaintiff does not, and properly so, claim that it is a

holder in due course.

It can not do so since it cannot claim that

it took the instrument without notice of a defense against the
cashing of the check some six weeks after being told to return the
check to Regency.

III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED PLAINTIFF'S
ARGUMENT THAT THE FRAUDULENT CHECK STATUTE SHOULD BE
NARROWLY AND STRICTLY CONSTRUED WITHOUT LOOKING AT THE
SURROUNDING FACTS.
Plaintiff

asserted

at the

trial

court

level

that

Regency

should be liable under the fraudulent check statute under a strict
liability standard.

Plaintiff asserted that "if a check has been

dishonored and if notice is properly given for which there is no
satisfaction, the maker of the check is strictly liable." (R. 112)
Plaintiff apparently is making the same argument on appeal when it
10

argues that Section 7-15-1 is meaningless if the same burden of
proof is imposed as is imposed under the criminal bad check
statute, Section 76-6-505.
It does not appear to Regency that the trial court imposed
the same burden of proof in the instant case as would be imposed
in a criminal case.

Besides the obvious beyond a reasonable doubt

standard versus a preponderance of the evidence standard the
criminal bad check provision requires proof that the person who
issues the check does so knowing that it will not be paid by the
drawee.

If Plaintiff is asserting that the trial court rejected

Plaintiff's claim for failing to meet that same burden such an
assertion would be erroneous.

Nowhere in the court's ruling was

that standard discussed. (It should be noted parenthetically that
Plaintiff has never challenged Regency's position that there were
sufficient funds to cover the subject check in the account at the
time the check was offered and until the Plaintiff chose not to
accept the check at which time the funds were used for other
partnership purposes.)

There is no question that Regency would

have no problem establishing its innocence to a charge that the
check was issued knowing it would not be honored by the drawee.
The standard adopted by the trial court was that Plaintiff
had the burden to show that the check was given for value.
Further, the court was not adopting a strict liability standard
that the maker would be liable for a fraudulent check if a check
was dishonored for lack of funds regardless of the reason.
court appropriately considered the surrounding circumstances.
11

The
If

a strict liability was in fact the standard, the statute would
simply state that the maker of any check that bounces is liableperiod.

The statute, however, already says more than that.

Strict liability is not the standard.

CONCLUSION
The trial court's dismissal of the fraudulent check cause of
action against Regency should be upheld.

Plaintiff rejected the

offer of Regency and gave nothing of value to Regency nor gave up
anything of value in exchange for the check.

Plaintiff refused to

give up its claims against Bowers which Plaintiff alleged exceeded
$19,000.

Plaintiff rejected Regency's offer of $13,750. When put

to the proof of its claim Plaintiff established a claim of only
$5,246.

Now Plaintiff pursues an appeal continuing to assert a

claim for more than double what it could prove was actually due it
for materials supplied to the Project solely on a strict liability
interpretation of Section 7-15-1 of the Utah Code.

The appeal

ought to be soundly rejected.

Respectfully submitted this <J

day of April, 1989.

Walstad and Babcock, P.C.

Steven Crawley, Ai^^rney for
Defendants-Respondents
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